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Abstract 
An attempt was made to demonstrate laboratory 
conditions in which experiential components of meaning 
(i.e. perceptual and emotional correlates of observable 
stimuli and responses) pattern to form a gestalt. Semantic 
differential scales were used to measure the meaning of 
simple visual figures in two phases of the experiment. 
The first phase consisted of a pre- and post-exposure 
measurement of meaning with an intervening exposure to 
a compound visual display• In the second phase, subjects 
were exposed to an altered visual display and then rated 
the stimuli again. 
Results do not support the predictions that 
(1) the meaning of the central stimulus would change as 
a function of being presented in the context of other 
stimuli, or that (2) if the context is altered, then the 
meaning of the central stimulus would change again. 
Methodological problems and alternative theoretical 
notions are considered in the Discussion. 
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Introduction 
The study of meaning is characterized by ambiguity, 
controversy and inadequacy. There is widespread disagree-
ment about what constitutes an adequate definition of meaning, 
about how the study should proceed, and about what should be 
included in a theory of meaning. With the exception of some 
behaviourists, most psychologists have at least agreed that. 
it is an important and unavoidable problem. Concerned only 
with the objective determining conditions of behaviour, the 
behaviourists have said in the past that meaning has no 
relevance to their strict stimulus-response (S-R) model. 
However, some members of this group are beginning to accept 
and study verbal behaviour as legitimate subject matter for 
psychology, and are consequently finding themselves confronted 
with the problems of understanding and meaning. 
Although many psychologists have acknowledged the 
broad scope and importance of meaning in the explanation of 
behaviour, very little research has been done which deals 
directly with meaning as a psychological variable. This 
lack of relevant research is at once a consequence of, and 
a contributing factor to, the confusion and uncertainty 
which surrounds the problem of definition. Early theorists 
(e.g. James, Titchener, McDougall, Barrett, etc.) stayed on 
1 
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conceptual-theoretical ground in their discussions of 
meaning, providing little material that was useful to the 
experimentalists. Efforts at the conceptual type of 
definition virtually disappeared from the literature as 
the behaviourist influence on North American psychology 
became strong and that which was not operationally defined 
or easily adapted to the hypothetico-deductive method 
was declared "off limits". 
Interest in the problem was re-awakened by the 
observation of phenomena in experiments focused in other 
directions which could not be explained in terms of the 
simple S-R models that had been proposed for the explanation 
of animal behaviour. The combined effect of this origin, 
and the strong behaviourist influence in general, was to 
limit experimental work on meaning to observable behaviour, 
with major emphasis on verbal phenomena. This work, however, 
has not brought consensus on any particular definition of 
meaning; in fact, controversy over the broad issue of 
whether meaning belongs to the behavioural or phenomenological 
realm is still alive. 
...the meaning of meaning, in general and as a 
psychological variable in particular, is so 
equivocal. The term may refer to anything from 
a simple act (the meaning of an object is the 
response it evokes) or a simple connection, to 
a 'philosophy of life'... Meaning can refer to 
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designation, denotation, connotation, signific-
ation, causation, intention, purpose, interpret-
ation, evaluation, emotion, action, or all of 
these. When the term is used, it is sometimes 
unclear in just which sense it is being used. 
Furthermore, these various meanings of meaning 
themselves need explication with respect to the 
psychological processes involved in them. 
(Creelman, 1966, p. 14) 
Thus, ambiguity and confusion continue to 
characterize the search for the meaning of meaning. 
Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
Early definitions of meaning were static and 
descriptive, with their focus on the content of experience. 
When behaviourists (e.g. Staats and Staats, 1959) began to 
conceptualize meaning as a response, learned according to 
the principles of operant and classical conditioning and 
maintained by reinforcement, it was brought into the fold 
of learning theory and began to be defined in terms of a 
process. The single-stage S-R model proved inadequate 
for even some of the strictest operant conditioners to 
account for the phenomenon of semantic generalization, and 
the transition was made to a mediational model (S-O-R). 
Based on the Hullian notion of "implicit" responses, 
this model was adopted by Cofer and Foley (1942), Mowrer 
(1954), Osgood (1956), and to some extent by Staats and 
Staats (1963), although the latter subsequently reverted 
to the strict S-R formulation. Both single-stage (S-R) 
models and two- (or more) stage (S-O-R) models are still 
the most prevalent and popular theories of meaning in 
North American psychology. 
Creelman (1966) has made a comprehensive critical 
review of the experimental literature on meaning, including 
both American and Russian experimentation, and her summary of 
4 
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four major hypotheses about meaning is helpful: 
1. The meaning of anything (stimulus) can be defined in 
terms of the response to it; 
2. Meaning can be understood in terms of simple associa-
tive (direct) connections between stimulus and response; 
3. Meaning can best be conceptualized as a hypothetical 
construct or as an intervening variable — a mediating 
process which is essentially unobserved and unobservable 
and consists of scaled-down versions of previously overt 
responses which, when elicited, serve as stimuli for 
other overt responses; 
4. Meaning might be regarded as a complex interconnected 
response system, including visceral, sensory and cognitive 
elements. 
(Creelman, 1966, p. 207-208) 
While it is generally accepted that hypotheses 
one and two are inadequate (see Creelman, 1966), the third 
one — the mediation model — still has strong support 
in many quarters. However, a number of criticisms have 
also been levelled against it. Fodor (1965), for example, 
articulates the following argument: In order for the 
mediation theorist to make his theory coherent, he must 
adopt the postulate that each r , or fractional mediating 
response, must be identified with one and only one gross 
response* Two serious criticisms follow from this point. 
One is that the response components that are scaled-down 
versions of gross responses, and which are thus candidates 
for the position of r , are not of a type likely to be 
associated with R's on a one to one basis. Secondly, once 
6 
this postulate is adopted, the only distinction between 
single-stage and mediation theories is the observability 
of the responses they invoke, or the types of theoretical 
terms used in the explanation. 
As long as r is conceptualized as a hypothetical 
construct which is an entity, a static "part", these 
criticisms are valid and damaging to the mediation theory. 
It is true that many mediation theorists would accept this 
conceptualization and therefore their theory is vulnerable 
to Fodor's attack. Although Creelman calls it a "mediat-
ing process", she goes on to say that this process "con-
sists of scaled-down versions of previously overt responses 
which, when elicited, serve as stimuli for other overt 
responses". It is difficult to see how this collection 
of responses is a process. Fodor also discusses a concep-
tion of mediation theory (based on Mowrer, 1960) which 
sees a series of overt and covert responses as single links 
in a chain. 
However, it may be possible to think of r as 
a complex whole composed of interconnected parts, or 
"scaled-down versions of previously overt responses", 
as well as the relationships between the parts and the 
processes which establish those relationships. This view 
corresponds more closely to that expressed in Creelman's 
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fourth hypothesis. She advocates an enlarged view of 
stimulus and response which involves the context and 
patterning of internal and external events, i.e. the 
subjective as well as the objective determining conditions 
of the psychological situation. She suggests two ways of 
defining the meaning of a particular stimulus or event. 
One is in terms of the response to it, where the term 
"response" is understood to refer to the pattern of changes 
within a context. If the context is included as an integral 
part of the stimulus situation, "... the meaning of a 
particular event would be a patterned function of both 
stimulus and response elementsr rather than single links 
in a chain" (p. 214). Both of these definitions are based 
on an identification of meaning with the phenomenology of 
the experiencing organism where experience is viewed as 
the totality of the organism's responsiveness which includes 
the patterning of changes brought about by a specific 
stimulus, but also considering that these changes take 
place in a context of on-going processes and in turn alter 
that context. 
It must be acknowledged that these are general 
theoretical statements without detailed operational def-
initions and a solid empirical basis, but there are three 
major advantages to this conceptual model of meaning. 
8 
One is that it allows for a dynamic, process definition 
and approach to the problem. Second, it includes the 
importance of patterning, i.e. the relationships between 
the parts. Finally, it also takes into account the con-
text in which meaning occurs and which may also be a 
determining factor of the meaning that is formed. 
Since Creelman wrote her book in 1966, much 
work has been done in information-processing which relates 
to the concept of patterning-within-a-context. Sayre 
(1969) describes information-processing theory as a general 
model for the specific feature of patterned perceptual 
response in humans as follows. When a person perceives 
a configuration (any grouping of objects) in his or her 
environment, he or she makes certain demands on it and 
these demands determine the pattern of the response that 
is made. A configuration takes on a pattern according to 
the significance, or meaning, it has for the organism. 
Sayre contends that this significance is determined, in 
turn, by the needs or interests that are salient for the 
organism at any given time. He does not go beyond this 
point to say what determines the needs or interests of 
the organism, but it may be that he is referring to the 
context, or internal stimulus conditions. The ongoing 
processes within the individual respondent -- the continual 
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organization and re-organization of the organism's per-
ceptions and emotions which are associated with his 
environment — lend meaning to each new S-R situation 
and are, in turn, altered by them. 
Muijen (1972) says about information-processing 
models of visual pattern apprehension that the human 
information processor does not only process information 
but also transforms that information into interacting 
experiential units. In other words, living organisms do 
not merely register physical information but also per-
ceive, i.e. experience, their environment. These ideas 
and some of the research which has been done on perceptual 
patterning and information-processing seem to generally 
lend some support to Creelman's suggestion. 
Researchers have come to study, and deem impor-
tant, both the context and the patterning of the occurring 
S-R situation. Both Sayre and Muijen talk about the 
necessity of including experiential correlates of physical 
stimuli or events and the dynamic interrelationships 
between them in complete psychological theories. Yet 
neither theorists of meaning and perceptual patterning, 
nor information-processing theorists attempt to deal with 
these components in any depth. For example, Sayre says: 
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An essential feature of the visual patterned 
response in man and in other organisms with 
comparably complex visual processes is that 
patterns appear as wholes with parts, but that 
the parts when viewed independently of the whole 
take on different characteristics ... Of course 
patterns are composed of parts that taken sep-
arately do not possess the characteristics of 
the whole. 
(Sayre, 1969, p. 142) 
But this is merely stated, with no attempt at an explanation 
of how it comes about. Gestalt psychologists long ago 
identified this unique characteristic of complex organisms 
as an important one. They went a little further, however, 
attempting to formulate laws about how our perceptual 
fields are organized, but they did not go beyond the 
molar, descriptive level. Furthermore, there is no indica-
tion of how complete the listing of Gestalt laws is, nor of 
how they themselves combine to determine meanings. 
If it is true that the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts taken separately, then the processes or 
relationships between the parts must be among the deter-
mining conditions. But if internal stimulus conditions, 
including the patterning of covert responses, are to be 
included in a complete theory of meaning, then experiential 
correlates of physical stimuli and responses must be 
studied. Evidence for experiential patterning and/or 
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gestalt formation is needed at a systematic, molecular, 
predictive level. 
In an extensive search of the literature (see 
the Bibliography) it has proven difficult to find research 
which relates directly to these issues. The literature 
on meaning, perceptual patterning, information-processing, 
and concept formation was expected to be relevant. 
However, it is not possible to draw from this literature 
a solid theoretical or empirical basis for the present 
study. A detailed discussion of this research would 
constitute a critical review which is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but a brief overview of each of these areas 
as it relates to the present problem will be given* 
The inadequacies of the experimental research 
on meaning (e.g. Creelman, 1966) have already been pointed 
out earlier in this section. The work of Osgood and his 
associates (e.g. Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957; 
Osgood, 1962, 1969; Snider and Osgood, 1969) deserves more 
attention at this point* Osgood's semantic differential 
technique is the only measure of meaning which attempts, 
or purports, to tap internal processes. However, it is not 
clear that this method taps those processes which are 
operative in the formation of meaning. The theoretical 
12 
basis of the semantic differential is the mediation model 
which is not a dynamic process model. While the factor 
structures and conceptual models which are constructed on 
the basis of factor analytic work do attempt to take into 
account the interrelationships between some experiential 
components of meaning, they do not attempt to measure the 
processes by which those relationships are formed. Presum-
ably this occurs within the framework of learning theory 
according to the principles of operant and classical 
conditioning. However, these principles have not been 
applied to situations in which more than two stimuli are 
"conditioned", or associated, to one another, at least 
where the question of meaning of those stimuli is concerned. 
Research on perceptual patterning and perceptual 
learning (e.g. Gibson and Gibson, 1955; Gibson and Walk, 
1956; Gibson, 1969) has centered around the perceptual 
processing of specific observable dimensions of stimuli, 
particularly visual and auditory. The interaction of the 
incoming stimulus array with organismic variables has not 
been addressed in the Gibsons' work. Perceptual processing 
has increasingly come to be studied by information-process-
ing researchers. Those who have dealt with the processing 
of visual stimuli, particularly nonsense shapes, include 
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Arnoult, 1956, 1960; Attneave, 1955; Attneave and Arnoult, 
1956; Egeth, 1967; Grill, 1971; and Egeth, Jonides and 
Wall, 1972. These studies also deal primarily with 
physical characteristics of stimuli and methodological 
variables such as exposure time, latency of response, 
serial vs. simultaneous presentation, etc. Explanations 
are not offered in terms of representation of stimulus 
patterns by an organized set of internal relations which 
would require the operation of different processes than 
those which are typically postulated to explain pattern 
recognition and perceptual learning. In short, the meaning 
of stimulus patterns is rarely studied from an experiential 
viewpoint by information-processing theorists. 
Another large body of literature which was 
expected to be potentially relevant to the problem of 
meaning formation is the work on concept formation. 
Studies in this area (e.g. Bruner and Postman, 1949; 
Bruner et al, 1966; Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956; 
Bourne, 1963; Bourne and Parker, 1964; Trabasso, 1960) 
involve the analysis of the roles of particular information 
variables, cues and strategies in the solution of problems. 
Information is selected and deliberately manipulated by 
the subject who is working towards a goal using particular 
cues and strategies. In experiential meaning formation, 
14 
at least as it is studied in this paper, there is no such 
goal which serves to organize and focus the subject's 
attention. It is not clear how knowledge of the cognitive 
processes which are involved in concept formation relates 
to the understanding of perceptual processes by which 
information is associated and organized in the absence 
of a guiding purpose or conscious selection. 
In summary, then, there does not seem to be 
experimental evidence which relates to a conceptualization 
of meaning as a process which includes the context in 
which meaning occurs and the dynamic interrelationships 
between internal stimulus and response elements. More 
specifically, conditions have not been manipulated at 
the formation of meaning in a way that would allow us 
to determine how experiential components of meaning are 
related to one another. 
Statement of Purpose 
This study was an attempt to demonstrate one 
laboratory situation in which experiential components of 
meaning pattern to form a gestalt. The question addressed 
was: Must the patterns of relationships between experiential 
components of meaning (i.e. perceptual and emotional 
correlates of observable stimuli and responses) be includ-
ed as determing conditions of the meaning of a stimuluss 
or are they only organizational conveniences, such that 
the components can be re-organized in other patterns with 
no significant effect on the meaning of the stimulus? 
An alternative formulation of the problem is as follows: 
Do images and affects which are associated with observable 
stimuli exist in independent molecular units or do they 
become associated to one another in some manner to form 
a pattern or gestalt? 
It is also possible, and probably more likely, 
that one process is operative under specific stimulus 
and/or organismic and/or environmental conditions, and the 
alternate process under other conditions. In the same 
vein, an interaction of processes under certain combina-
tions of conditions may also be a reality. 
15 
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The general purpose of the present study was to 
discover whether changes in meaning would occur when two 
or more stimuli first occurred together, then one of those 
stimuli occurred again alone. Simple visual figures 
were used as stimuli. One figure was chosen to be the 
central stimulus figure and four other figures formed the 
context. 
The meaning of a stimulus was operationally 
defined as the set of ratings on semantic differential 
scales of simple visual figures. The context was opera-
tionally defined as the spatial pattern of four simple 
visual figures arranged around the central stimulus. 
The first experimental prediction was that if 
the central stimulus is presented in the context, then the 
meaning of that stimulus is altered. 
Alteration of the context was operationally 
defined as the removal of one of the four context: stimuli 
from the primary visual display to an adjacent visual 
display. This adjacent display consisted of only the 
central stimulus in the preceding experimental stage. 
The second experimental prediction was that if 
the context of the central stimulus is altered, then the 
meaning of that stimulus is altered further. 
Method 
Subjects 
Thirteen males and 40 females, ages 17 to 48, 
from undergraduate psychology courses at Wilfrid Laurier 
University served as volunteer subjects. The modal age 
was 22. In the first phase, there were 32 subjects in 
the experimental group (8 males, 24 females) and 21 
subjects in the control group (5 males, 16 females). 
Thirty subjects in the experimental group and 14 subjects 
in the control group returned for Phase II. 
Apparatus 
Two adjoining research rooms were used. The 
subject was seated at a table in one room facing a frost-
ed screen upon which the stimuli were back projected by 
slide projectors in the adjoining room. Figure 1 shows 
the layout and distances in the research rooms. Two 
Kodak Carousel 850 projectors were used to present the 
2"X2" slides. They were fitted with tachistoscopic 
lenses which were attached to a timing device so that the 
slides could be presented with an exposure time of 4 
seconds and an inter-trial interval of 2 seconds. During 
the pre- and post-exposure periods, the experimenter 
advanced the slides manually by use of a remote switch. 
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Figure 1: Research Rooms and Apparatus 
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Stimulus Materials and Scales 
The visual stimuli were chosen on the basis of 
pilot work as outlined in Appendix A and prepared on 
2"X2" slides. Five slides showed each of the central 
stimulus (A) and the four context stimuli (Bl, B2, B3, 
B4) alone. For the exposure stage of Phase I a compound 
slide of A surrounded by the four context stimuli was 
constructed. Effects of location were controlled by 
systematic incomplete counterbalancing; thus, there 
were 4 compound slides for the experimental condition, 
with 4 corresponding sub-groups. In the experimental 
group, the adjacent visual displays consisted of the 
compound slide which appeared directly in front of the 
subject and a slide with A only on the display to the 
left. For the control group, A only appeared on both 
displays. Figure 2a is a reproduction of each of the 
single stimuli. Figure 2b shows the four compound slides. 
Figures 3a and 3b are examples of the visual display for 
the Control Group and for the Experimental Group, Phase I. 
The same set of 20 semantic differential scales 
which were used in pilot work were used in the experiment 
(see Appendix B). They were arranged in different random 
orders for each stimulus, and the position of the bi-
polar opposites of each word pair were determined randomly 
20 
FIGURE 2: Stimulus Figures 
a. Individual Stimuli: 
Bl B2 
B3 B4 
20a 
FIGURE 2: Stimulus Figures 
b. Compound Stimuli: 
W 
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FIGURE 3: Sample Visual Displays 
a. Control Group, both Phases 
c. Experimental Group, Phase II 
(by the flip of a coin) in each case. 
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Procedure 
Phase I: The first phase consisted of a pre-exposure 
measurement of meaning, exposure to a visual display, 
and a post-exposure measurement, 
In the pre-exposure stage, A and each of the 
four context figures were presented separately in 
succession and subjects in both groups completed semantic 
differential scales for each one. All subjects rated 
A first on all scales. Order effects in presentation of 
the remaining four context figures were controlled by 
complete counterbalancing. The subject was seated in 
front of the right-hand side of the projection screen and 
instructions were given as follows: 
The purpose of this experiment is to discover now meaning 
is formed. I am not talking about meaning in the sense 
of dictionary definitions or values, but in terms of 
experience — perceptions, emotions, thoughts, etc. 
Very little research has been done on meaning at all, and 
none that I know of on experiential components of meaning, 
so this is really an exploratory study. I will explain 
more about what I am trying to do and what I hope to find 
w^en we have finished both phases of the experiment. Do 
you have any questions about the general nature of the 
research that I can perhaps answer now? 
What I am going to ask you to do is very simple. First 
I'll show you some slides one at a time and ask you to 
fill out these scales. Then I'm going to present two 
slides together a number of times. For this part, I'd 
like you to sit back and watch, but pay attention to the 
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slides. Then I'll show you some more slides one at a 
time again and ask you to fill out some more scales• 
O.K.? 
Here are the instructions for the scales. If you will read 
them over, I'll return in a couple of minutes to answer 
any questions you have about them and explain exactly 
what to do with these scales. (Leave room to set up 
slides in equipment room and return in 2 to 3 minutes.) 
Do you understand the instructions? 
When I go back in the other room, I'll put up a slide 
immediately. Fill out the entire first page for that 
slidee Then when you are ready to turn the page, say 
"O.K." and I211 put up the next slide. Fill out the 
whole page for that slide and then go on as before. 
In other words, there are five pages and five slides — 
one page per slide — and you have as long as you need 
to complete the scales, but move fairly quickly through 
them as the instructions indicate. 0eK.? 
When you have completed the last page, just put the 
scales aside. I'll turn out the light from the other 
room and present two slides together a number of times. 
Please sit back and pay attention to the presentation. 
Then I'll come back with another set of scales to fill 
out. 
In the exposure stage, the visual display 
consisting of two adjacent slides was presented 15 times 
with an exposure time of 4 seconds and an inter-trial 
interval of 2 seconds for both groups. For the control 
group, the two slides showed only A. For the experimental 
group, the right-hand slide was a compound and the left-
hand slide showed only A. When the presentation was over, 
the experimenter switched the subject's desk light on 
from the equipment room. 
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For the post-exposure stage the experimenter 
re-entered the research room, removed the completed scales 
and handed the subject the second set of scales with the 
following brief instructions: 
Now I'm going to show you some slides one at a time again 
as in the first part. Fill out the scales in the same 
way — one page per slide — and let me know when to go on 
to the next one. O.K.? 
A and each of the context figures were presented separately 
in succession with A being rated first on all scales and 
the order of the context figures counterbalanced as in 
'the pre-exposure stage. For the experimental group, 
the compound slide to which the particular subject had 
been exposed was presented last in the series and rated 
on all scales. 
Analysis: A comparison of each experimental subject's 
pre-exposure and post-exposure ratings of A was performed 
in the following manner. A difference of 2 or more scale 
points was arbitrarily chosen as the criterion for a 
change in meaning. The pre-exposure scale ratings of 
each context figure for those scales on which these diff-
erences occurred for A were examined. An assumption was 
made that if, for example, the rating of A on scale 17 
had changed from "3" to "5", then the context figure 
which had been rated "5" or higher on scale 17 in the pre-
25 
exposure stage had influenced trie post-exposure rating 
of A by being associated with it during exposure. The 
context figure which was rated most often (i.e. on the 
greatest number of scales) in the direction of change 
observed in A was removed from the right-hand display 
in Phase II. An example of this analysis is given in 
Table 1, 
Phase II: The second phase consisted of an exposure 
stage followed by a final measurement of meaning of the 
stimuli. 
The subject was seated in front of the right-
hand side of the display and given the following instruc-
tions: 
This time I am going to show you two slides together as 
I did in the middle last time. So for this part, I just 
want you to watch and pay attention to the screen. When 
that is over, I'll turn the light on from the other room 
and show you one slide at a time. You can take these 
scales yourself and fill them out as before — one page 
for each slide — let me know when to go on to the next 
one — O.K.? 
In the exposure stage the control group saw only A on 
both slides again. Each subject in the experimental 
group saw three of the context figures together with A 
on the right-hand slide and the fourth figure together 
with A on the left-hand slide. The figure to be removed 
was determined by the analysis described in the preceding 
section. It appeared on the left-hand slide in the same 
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TABLE 1 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALE RATINGS, FIGURE A 
Sample Comparison of Pre-exposure and Post-exposure Ratings 
Scales: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
P r e - e x p . 
P o s t - e x p . 
4 3 6 4 3 5 6 3 6 6 
5 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 6 
2 1 7 6 3 5 5 5 3 4 
4 3 6 6 2 5 4 2 4 2 
D i f f e r e n c e s 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 3 0 2 2 1 0 
+ - + + 
0 
Scales on which 
Differences were 
Observed: 
Differences: 
5 
+2 
9 
-3 
11 
+2 
12 
+ 2 
18 
_"3 
20 
-2 
Context figure 
ratings in pre-
exposure stage: Bl: 
B2: 
B3: 
B4: 
1 
4 
2 
5 
7 
1 
6 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
1 
5 
5 
6 
4 
5 
2 
5 
1 
4 
4 
6 
Figure B4 has made the greatest difference (3 scales) 
Conclusion: Remove B4 from display in Phase II. 
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location as it had previously been present on the right-
hand display and the three remaining figures were present 
in their same locations. Figure 3° shows an example 
of this altered visual display. The number and length 
of presentations was the same as in Phase I. 
The post-exposure stage was the same as in Phase I 
except that the experimental group ratings were not 
obtained on the compound slide, 
Results 
A. Analysis of Group Data 
1. Factor Analysis: 
For each group there were 10 sets of 20 scale 
ratings, ieet one set for each of the five stimulus figures 
in the pre-exposure stage and one set for each stimulus 
in the post-exposure stage. Thus, 20 separate 20X20 
intercorrelation matrices were generated by summing across 
subjects. They were factored by the Varimax technique, 
Factor loadings and variance percentages for the first 
four factors for each stimulus figure are given in App-
endix C. 
While some general patterns amcng the factor 
loadings can be identified, a broad range of scales load 
high on each factor and there is considerable overlap of 
scales among the factors. This is particularly true for 
the control group when the factors for all figures are 
considered. In the experimental group, results are some-
what clearer. Table 2 gives a summary of the scales which 
load over .70 on each of the first three factors for two 
or more stimuli. 
Generally it can be stated that the factors are 
not independent dimensions. There are a few exceptions: 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF HIGH SCALE LOADINGS* FOR FIRST THREE FACTORS 
All Figures 
Scales 
ugly-beautiful 
good-bad 
unpleasant-pist 
passive-active 
cairn-excitable 
slow-fast 
fancy-plain 
simple-complex 
meaningful-mngless 
unusual-usual 
unstable-stable 
careful-careless 
cool-warm 
masculine-feminine 
horizontal-vertical 
sober-drunk 
hard-soft 
rounded-angular 
large-small 
heavy-light 
Experimental 
1 2 
XO 
XO 
XO 
XO 
X XO 
XO 
X 0 
X 
0 
0 
X 
0 
X 0 
X 
X 
Group 
3 
0 
XO 
XO 
XO 
0 
0 
XO 
X 
Control Group 
1 2 3 
XO 
XO 
XO 
XO 
XO 
XO 
XO 
XO 
0 XO 
X 0 
XO 
XO 
XO 
X 0 
X 0 
0 
X 
X 
0 
0 X 
X 
0 0 
0 X 
0 
0 
X 
*High Scale Loadings = Over +.70 or Below -.70 
X: Loads high in pre-exposure only 
O: Loads high in post-exposure only 
XO: Loads high in both pre-exposure and post-exposure 
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the evaluative dimension is clearly identifiable in the 
experimental group and the activity factor is also relat-
ively independent for this group. However, in the control 
group almost every scale loads high on at least two factors 
in both pre-exposure and post-exposure stages. 
Closer examination of the results for the central 
stimulus figure (A) alone does not lend a great deal of 
clarity to the situation. Table 3 gives the factors anc. 
the amount of variance accounted for by each for both 
groups. 
TABLE 3 
FACTOR LABELS AND AMOUNT OF VARIANCE FOR FIGURE A 
Experimental Group Control Group 
Pre-Exposure Post-Exposure Pre-Exposure Post-Exposure 
Factors 
Complexity- Complexity-
Evaluative 21% Complexity 42% Activity 26% Activity 34 
Potency or 
2 Activity 20% Activity 17% Evaluative 21% Masculinity 3 
Hardness or 
3 Complexity 15% Potency 13% Potency (?) 15% (?) 12% 
Stability 11% Evaluative 12% Potency (?) 11% Stability (?) 
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While these results indicate a change in the factor 
structure for the experimental group, it is important to 
recognize that the labels applied to the factors are very 
loose, e.g. not all scales which load high on the factor 
labelled "activity" in the pre-exposure stage are the same 
as those which load high on the "activity" factor in the 
post-exposure stage. For the control group, the factor 
structures are much more difficult to define, and the labels 
are even more tenuous. In some cases, it is virtually 
impossible to make sense empirically of the group of 
scales which loads high on a particular factor. These are 
indicated by a question mark in parentheses (?) in Table 3. 
2. Differences between pre-exposure and post-exposure, 
Phase I: 
Sandler's A was used to test for differences in 
mean ratings of the central stimulus between pre-exposure 
and post-exposure. Results are given in Table 15, Appendix 
D. In the experimental group, two scales differed signif-
icantly at the .05 level. They were "meaningful-meaningless" 
and "passive-active". The control group showed significant 
differences on four scales: "large-small", "careful-
careless" , "unusual-usual", and "feminine-masculine". 
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3. Differences between experimental and control groups, 
Phase I: 
The t-test was computed on mean scale ratings 
in the pre-exposure and post-exposure stages to test for 
differences between the groups. Results are given in 
Table 16, Appendix D. There were no significant differences 
on any scales in the pre-exposure stage. In the post-
exposure stage mean ratings were significantly different 
at p=.05 on two scales: "heavy-light" and "feminine-
masculine" . 
B. Analysis of Individual Data 
Individual subjects1 data were analysed for two 
reasons: to detect any changes in meaning which may have 
occurred on an individual level but which cancel each 
other out in group analyses, and to assess changes in 
meaning in Phase II. Since the experimental conditions 
in the exposure stage of Phase II were determined indivi-
dually from each subject's scale ratings in Phase I, 
group analysis is inappropriate. 
However, there are few statistical tests for 
individual data, Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) 
described the D Score which gives the linear distance 
between two points in semantic space which can represent 
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either two concepts (figures, in this study) or the same 
figure measured over time. The D Score is obtained by 
squaring the difference between each scale value' for any 
two measurements of a fig.ure, summing these differences 
and then taking the square root. D refers to "assumed 
dissimilarity"? therefore, the higher the D Score, the 
less is the similarity between the two measurements of 
a figure. Results of D Score calculations are given in 
Tables 17 and 18, Appendix D. 
The sign test was used to test for significant 
differences between the distances for each group, since 
significance estimates are not available for individual 
data. If X represents the distance between ratings of 
A in the pre-exposure stage and ratings of A in the post-
exposure stage, and Y represents the distance between 
ratings of A in the post-exposure stage and ratings of 
A in Phase II, and Z represents the distance between 
ratings of A in the pre-exposure stage and ratings of A 
in Phase II, then the following significant differences 
are obtained. For both groups, X is greater than Y and 
Z is also greater than Y. There are no significant 
differences between X and Z for either group. These 
results are shown diagramatically in Figure 4. 
To summarize these results, it appears that 
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FIGURE 4 
Distances between Ratings of Figure A 
• A-2 
Y 
II 
A-l: Ratings of A in pre-exposure stage, Phase I 
A-2: Ratings of A in post-exposure stage, Phase I 
A-II: Ratings of A in Phase II 
A-l 
A-
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whatever distance was created between A in the pre-
exposure stage and post-exposure stage in Phase I was the 
greatest distance created; it was greater than that which 
was later created between A in the post-exposure stage 
and Phase II, and it was about the same as the distance 
between A in the pre-exposure and A in Phase II. 
Because there is no way of estimating the sig-
nificance of individual D Scores, individual subjects1 
rating score profiles were inspected. This examination 
did not reveal any systematic patterns or striking 
differences which might lend support to the predictions. 
Discussion 
The first experimental prediction was that if 
a stimulus is presented in the context of other stimuli, 
then the meaning of that stimulus will be altered. The 
results of the Sandler's A test do not confirm this 
prediction. More scale means were significantly diff-
erent for the control group from pre-exposure to post-
exposure than for the experimental group, which is in the 
opposite direction to that which would be expected for the 
prediction to be borne out. 
The factor analysis of Figure A seems to indicate 
that for the experimental group there was a dramatic 
change in the factor structure from pre-exposure to 
post-exposure. Upon close examination, however, it can 
be seen that the factors which are labelled similarly are 
defined by different scales in the two situations. For 
example, the factor labelled "complexity" accounts for 
almost three times as much variance in the post-exposure 
stage as it did in the pre-exposure stage. But only one 
scale loads high on this factor in both cases; the other 
two scales which define it are different. 
This suggests at least two possibilities. One 
is that two different dimensions may actually have been 
measured here, one of which may be "complexity" and 
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another which might more properly be called "plainness", 
or both may be re-labelled in some other way. Another 
possibility is that neither factor is an independent 
dimension and the factor loadings are chance occurrences. 
The superficially clear-cut shift in the evaluative factor 
presents a similar dilemma; the same scales do not load 
high in both cases. Taken in this context, the factor anal-
ysis is not conclusive evidence of a change in meaning from 
pre-exposure to post-exposure. 
Similarly, there is a discrepancy between the 
* results of the t-tests of differences between the groups 
and the factor analysis. The results of the t-tests do 
not confirm the first prediction; significant differences 
between the groups in the post-exposure stage would be 
expected to occur on more than two scales to consider the 
results positive. Yet the factor analysis indicates a 
distinct difference in factor structure between the exp-
erimental and control groups in both pre-exposure and 
post-exposure. Given that the factors are poorly defined 
and not independent, it seems most reasonable to put less 
weight on the factor analysis as an accurate representation 
of the situation. 
It was also predicted that if the context of the 
stimulus is altered, then the meaning of that stimulus 
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will again be altered. Since the context was altered by 
re-locating the stimulus figure which seemed to have made 
the greatest difference in the post-exposure ratings 
of A, it would be expected that the rating of A in Phase II 
would move in the direction of the rating of A in the 
pre-exposure stage. In terms of the available measures 
and the previously described representations, this means 
that the distance X should be greater than the distance 
Z. While the other combinations of distances v/ere 
significantly different from one another, X and Z were 
not. This does not necessarily disconfirm the prediction. 
If, in reality, a gestalt was formed in the post-exposure 
stage of Phase I, then alteration of the context which 
supposedly helped form that pattern may create an entirely 
new and different gestalt which is not related to either 
of the former patterns. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether the D Score or the sign test of differences between 
the D Scores would reveal this process. 
These results must be considered negative or at 
least inconclusive. There are a number of reasons why 
the predictions may not be supported by the data even 
if the theoretical basis for the predictions is sound. 
These reasons relate to the method of presentation of the 
stimuli, the nature of the particular stimuli used in this 
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experiment, the measuring instrument, and the lack of 
appropriate statistical tools for analysis of the data. 
Some comments will be made on each of these methodological 
problems before the theoretical notions behind the pre-
dictions are considered. 
The unexpected changes in meaning which occurred 
in the control group may be partially accounted for by 
the method of presentation of the stimuli. The initial 
presentation of all stimulus figures separately in 
succession may have created a context formed by temporal 
. patterning, in which A could be rated in the post-exposure 
stage and in Phase II. Associations and meanings which 
may have been formed in the prolonged exposure to each 
stimulus in the pre-exposure rating session may have 
overridden those formed in the relatively brief exposure 
stage for both groups, but especially for the control 
group where the presentation could have been particularly 
boring and/or confusing. This problem was anticipated 
in the design, but it was felt that the time required for 
the detailed ratings was a "necessary evil" if real and 
subtle changes in meaning were to be detected. Perhaps 
the effect of this circumstance was greater than anticip-
ated; so great, in fact, that it not only obscured measure-
ment of the meaning but it also affected the meaning of 
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the stimuli. 
A problem may also have been introduced by the 
use of novel visual stimuli. Simple figures were chosen 
in an attempt to avoid the problem of accurately measur-
ing and manipulating complex, pre-established meaning of 
familiar linguistic material. Even the meaning of complex 
visual material is difficult to measure. Bokander (1966) 
analysed semantic differential judgments of a collection 
of photographic portraits and found two dimensions which 
might be labelled evaluative and dynamism, but he could 
not further define any of the other factors. Although 
the problems of measuring complex meaning in the present 
study may have been avoided by the use of simple visual 
stimuli, it is possible that observed changes in meaning 
occurred partially as a result of subjects becoming fam-
iliar with novel stimuli rather than as a function of the 
experimental manipulation or patterning. 
Physical characteristics of visual stimuli, e.g. 
size, colour, angularity, orientation, density, number, 
etc., may affect the extent to which combinations of 
stimuli are perceived as integrated wholes which are 
different from the sum of their parts. A choice was made 
in designing the experiment between varying these specific 
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characteristics and choosing stimuli on the basis of 
more broadly defined criteria. To construct stimuli of 
even a moderate degree of complexity which would also 
allow all of the physical characteristics and their inter-
relationships to be controlled and deliberately varied 
would create an unmanageable factorial study. (This 
was considered at one point.) In fact, the results of 
such a study might be just as confusing and inconclusive 
as in this study. Consider, for example, the case where 
the only significant effect is the third-order interaction 
between four variables such as size, number, distance, 
and colour, where each of these variables is expressed 
at three levels. This does not give us any more insight 
into patterning or gestalt formation than do the present 
results. 
There is some data available on semantic differ-
ential ratings of visual stimuli such as nonsense figures 
and Rorschach and Holtzman inkblots which tend to support 
the choice of stimuli for this experiment. Bruner (1948), 
in his study of perceptual theory and the Rorschach test, 
suggests that the less structured a stimulus is, the 
stronger is the role of directive, nonsensory factors in 
determining perceptual organization. Borelli (1961) 
interpreted the results of his investigation of meanings 
of Rorschach cards in a similar way. He found that both 
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the rejection of, and the response to, a card result 
from the interaction of the individual's personal reaction 
to the meaning of a card with that meaning. The central 
stimulus in the present study was chosen from a large 
group of "nonsense figures" for its lack of structure 
with the expectation that this would facilitate the assoc-
iation of experiential correlates of the more structured 
context figures with those of the central stimulus. The 
negative results may, in fact, confirm this expectation 
in the following way. 
In studies of both Holtzman and Rorschach ink-
blots, Otten and Vande Castle (1963) and Daw (1965) 
found that chromatic cards were considered more pleasing 
than achromatic or mixed cards, and they were usually 
judged in a more extreme manner. Rabin (1959) also 
reports that coloured Rorschach cards were rated as being 
positive and pleasing. In the present experiment, three 
of the context figures were coloured and one was black. 
The results may reflect conflicting meanings of the cont-
ext figures which essentially cancel each other out when 
associated with the ambiguous central stimulus, rather 
than forming an integrated gestalt which is "projected 
onto" the central stimulus. 
These are some of the stimulus variables which may 
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have affected the extent to which the combination of 
these particular stimuli could be perceived as an integrat-
ed gestalt. Suggestions for overcoming some of these 
problems will be made in the Implications section. Perhaps 
the single most important lesson that can be learned from 
this study with respect to stimuli is that careful atten-
tion must be paid not only to the dimensions of the stim-
uli but also to the interrelationship of those dimensions, 
i.e. how responses to individual stimuli will interact 
with one another. Appropriate choice of stimuli will 
come only with continued experimentation since very little 
data exists at the present time to integrate the results 
of diverse studies which have dealt with the meaning of 
various types of stimulus materials. 
I turn now to the remaining methodological con-
siderations — the measuring instrument and statistical 
analysis. 
The appropriateness of the semantic differential 
as the measuring instrument for this study can certainly 
be questioned on the basis of the concerns expressed 
about it in the Literature Review and Theoretical Back-
ground section. However, only when the dynamic process 
conceptualization of meaning, including the patterning of 
experiential elements within a context, is more fully 
explored and understood, will it be possible to construct 
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an instrument to measure meaning based on these theoret-
ical considerations. But even if we accept that the 
semantic differential measures processes which are opera-
tive in the formation of experiential meaning, there is 
an additional problem with how the results of it can be 
analysed and interpreted. The data which arises from 
semantic differential ratings is descriptive in nature. 
It is the lack of appropriate inferential statistics 
for this data which makes it difficult to make affirmative 
statements about changes in meaning based on factor anal-
yses and D Scores. The use of A tests and t tests is 
not a very satisfactory alternative because of the high 
probability of alpha error involved. The results of the 
present study are not seriously jeopardized by the use 
of these tests since very few significant differences 
were found, but this does not solve the problem. 
This outline of the methodological problems 
which may help to account for the inconclusive results 
of the study points out the need for more data on complex 
stimulus materials and for refinement of measuring instru-
ments and statistical tools for analysis. However, the 
fact remains that the results generally did not support 
the predictions and the implications of this for the 
validity of the predictions must be considered. 
The predictions are in error to the extent that 
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the particular combination of conditions relating to 
subjects, the environment and stimuli used in this experi-
ment are conducive to the independence notion rather than 
the patterning process. The purpose of this study, to 
demonstrate a laboratory situation in which patterning 
occurs, was not fulfilled. However, the task remains 
to specify stimulus, organismic and environmental condi-
tions within which patterning may or may not occur. 
The inconclusive results may be an indication that the 
process of association of experiential components in mean-
ing formation is not as general or as easily demonstrated 
as was originally thought. A major outcome of this study, 
then, is not necessarily that the theoretical notions 
are unsound, but that the predictions made from them 
must be made more specifically to allow conclusions to 
be made about the particular conditions within which ges-
talt formation may occur. 
In the following section, the major findings of 
the study are summarized and the implications for further 
research are considered. 
Summary and Implications 
In terms of the experimental predictions, method-
ological considerations give rise to the following doubts 
about the results of the study: 
1. Did systematic and significant changes in meaning 
of the central stimulus actually occur which were not 
measured by the semantic differential, or which were not 
discernible by the statistical analyses used? 
2. Did the method of presentation of stimuli affect the 
. meaning of those stimuli, particularly with respect to 
the control group? 
3. Did the observed unpredicted changes in meaning occur 
as a function of subjects becoming familiar with novel 
stimuli? 
4. Did this particular combination of context figures 
have conflicting meanings which were antithetical to the 
formation of gestalt? 
Future research might incorporate some of the 
following changes in an effort to overcome these problems. 
A procedure for familiarizing subjects with stimuli before 
experimental manipulations are made may eliminate the 
possibility of spurious meaning changes due to adaptation 
to novel stimuli. If fewer scales were used and only the 
meaning of the central stimulus were measured, the reduction 
in time spent on pre-exposure and post-exposure measurement 
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might increase the effectiveness of the exposure stage. 
The effect of stimulus characteristics such as colour 
and structure might be investigated in a factorial study 
where coloured, ambiguous context figures are compared 
to achromatic, highly structured figures. A more complex 
experimental design which would allow for better control 
of stimulus variables might eliminate the necessity of 
using the semantic differential to measure meaning. This 
would also help solve the problem of finding appropriate 
statistics to analyse semantic differential data. 
The larger theoretical considerations in design-
ing future experiments must be the specification of 
stimulus, organismic and environmental conditions. The 
results of this study, together with the results of some 
other research, point out some ways in which stimulus 
conditions may affect gestalt formation and how they can 
be further specified and controlled. More research in 
which the results of isolated studies of experiential 
meaning are integrated with one another may begin to shed 
some light on the particular processes which are opera-
tive in meaning formation and the relative amounts of 
variance accounted for by each in the total picture. 
This study did not succeed in demonstrating a 
laboratory situation in which the patterning of relationships 
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between experiential components of meaning occurred. 
Further research is needed to specify subject, organismic 
and environmental conditions within which this process 
of meaning formation is operative. Creativity and imagin-
ation will be required to formulate alternative approaches 
to the problem in light of the lack of a solid theoretical 
and empirical basis for studying this conceptualization 
of meaning formation. 
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APPENDIX A 
Pilot Study No. 1 
Pilot Study No. 2 
Pilot Study No. 1 
Purpose 
1. To select a meaningless, ambiguous random shape to be 
the central stimulus (A) in the experiment. 
2. To select four (4) colourful, meaningful stimuli to 
form a context for A in the experiment. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eight undergraduate university students at Wilfrid 
Laurier University served as volunteer subjects. 
Apparatus 
A flip-chart stand was built out of a 24,,X11V 
piece of pressboard with two 3" metal binder rings attached 
to the top, and a 2"X4" board attached as a base at the 
back. A heavy weight (wooden box full of metal parts 
painted flat black) was placed on the 2"X4" to hold the 
apparatus firmly on a square wooden table. The random 
shape stimulus figures were cut out of black Letra-Colour 
with a design knife and pasted onto white bristol board, 
8y'Xll", in which two holes were punched to fit them onto 
the binder rings. 
The context stimuli were painted with acrylics on 
white canvasette, 8VX11" , in which holes were punched 
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similar to the random shapes. 
The subject sat at a square metal table 4 feet 
away from the flip-chart, with the stimuli at approximately 
eye level. The experimenter used a Heuer stop-watch to 
time exposure of the random stimuli. The stimulus figures 
were flipped over manually by the experimenter. 
Stimulus Materials and Scales 
Six random shapes were chosen from a group of 
180 shapes used in a study by Vanderplas and Garvin (1959) 
on the basis of low association values and low content 
values. They were photographed from the journal, enlarged 
onto 8V!X11" paper, traced onto black Letracolour and cut 
out with a design knife, then cemented to 8%,!X11" pieces 
of white bristol board. 
The nine context stimuli were designed by the 
author and painted in acrylics on canvasette by a fellow 
student. An attempt was made to create four simple and 
four more complex coloured figures intuitively incorporat-
ing the three dimensions cited by Osgood, Suci and Tannen-
baum (1957) as the main experiential components of meaning 
— evaluative, potency and activity. The four simple 
stimuli were various colours and shapes; five more complex 
stimuli were created which consisted of the basic dimensions 
(i.e. colour, similar shape) of the four simple ones, but 
they had some structure which was considered more commonly 
"meaningful". 
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The set of 20 semantic differential scales (see 
Appendix B) were taken from a study by Elliott and Tannen-
baum (1963), with the exception that "colourful-colourless" 
was replaced by "meaningful-meaningless". All 20 scales 
were printed on one page, but arranged in different random 
orders for each stimulus, and the positions of the bi-
polar word pairs were determined randomly by the flip of 
a coin. The instructions for completing the scales were 
adapted from Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) and printed 
on separate pages (see Appendix B). 
Procedure 
The six random shapes were presented twice each in 
different random orders for each subject with the restric-
tion that the same figure was not presented twice in a row. 
They were flipped over manually by the experimenter every 
30 seconds while the subject wrote associative responses 
on a sheet of 8"X11" white lined lecture paper. 
The nine stimulus figures were presented once each 
on the same flip-chart. They were also arranged in differ-
ent random orders for each subject. Subjects were given a 
page of 20 semantic differential scales for each figure 
on which they rated the stimulus at their own speed. 
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Results 
Random Shapes 
Three measures were computed on the responses to 
the random shapes: 
1. Consistency - Number of subjects identifying the shape 
as "same" or repeated the initial response on the second 
presentation of it. Results show that most subjects were 
aware of the double presentation — scores ranged from 
5 (out of 8) to 8 on the 6 shapes, with 3 shapes being 
identified as "same" by 7 out of 8 subjects. 
2. Meaninglessness - Number of responses of "nothing", 
"nonsense", "nil", etc. Here, all 16 responses were 
considered (2 for each subject) as there were a few 
discrepancies in responses to the same shape. Scores were 
generally low for this category, ranging from 0 to 10 out 
of 16. 
3. Homogeneity of meaning - Number of similar content 
responses to each shape, i.e. besides "nonsense", "nothing", 
etc. Content responses to three of the six shapes were 
completely heterogeneous, i.e. there were no similar 
content responses. One shape looked like a jaw to two 
people; three subjects felt that one shape resembled a 
face or human figure, while two others responded to the 
same shape with "chunk of ice". The sixth shape looked like 
a building of some kind to 4 out of 8 subjects. 
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Context Figures 
Mean scores were computed on scale ratings for 
each figure. Frequencies of mean scores falling between 
1.0 and 3.0 at one end of the scale, and 5.0 and 7.0 at the 
other end were tallied fpr each figure. Thus, the 
"scores" for each figure consisted of number of means 
out of 20 of 1.0 to 3.0 and 5.0 to 7.0. Scores thus 
computed ranged from 7 to 15 * 
Conclusions 
One purpose of this pilot was to select a random 
shape to be the central stimulus figure in the visual 
stimuli for the experiment. The main criteria for select-
ing the shape were meaninglessness and ambiguity, i.e. 
heterogeneity of meaning. The shape which was selected 
had a meaninglessness score of 10 and a homogeneity of 
meaning score of 0, i.e. no similar content responses. 
In addition, 7 out of 8 subjects identified this shape as 
being the same on its second presentation. 
The second purpose of the pilot was to select four 
figures to form the context for the random shape in the 
experiment. The criterion for selection was richness of 
meaning, defined in operational terms to be the frequency 
of extreme mean scores on the semantic differential scales. 
Thus, four figures with the highest scores (as described 
in the Results section) were selected. Two figures had 
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a score of 15 and one was 13. Three figures had 10 
means which fell into this range. In order to select one 
of these stimuli, "borderline" means of 3.0 and 5.0 
were eliminated. When this was done, two figures had nine 
means which fell between 1.0 and 2.875 at one end and 
5.125 and 7.0 at the other. The third figure still had 
10 means in this range and so was selected as the fourth 
context stimulus. 
Pilot Study No. 2 
Introduction 
The shape which was selected as meaningless and 
ambiguous in Pilot Study No. 1 was a black, angular 
shape. Pollio (1974) suggested that sharp edges and corners 
evoke negative associations (p.358). The implications for 
this study were that the random shape might be more meaning-
ful than was originally found in the pilot study, and that it 
was overloaded on negative meaning. This would work 
4
 against the experiment in that it would be more difficult 
for a negative stimulus to "pick up" meaning from the 
context stimuli. In order to determine the extent to 
which this might be true, several shapes were drawn up 
and semantic differential ratings obtained on tham. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this pilot study was to select a 
random shape to be the central stimulus in the experiment. 
Method 
Subjects 
Five undergraduate students at Wilfrid Laurier 
University served as volunteer subjects. 
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Apparatus 
The apparatus and experimental room were the same 
as those used in Pilot Study No. 1. 
Stimulus Materials and Scales 
Five shapes were used as stimuli: 
1. The black angular shape which was selected in Pilot 
Study No.l. 
2. The same shape was cut out of grey Letrafilm and applied 
to an 8VX11" piece of white bristol board. 
3. The angular corners of the black shape were rounded 
off to create a similar shape, but "softer". 
4. The rounded off shape was also cut out of grey Letra-
film and applied to 8yfXll" white bristol board* 
5. A circle, 5" in diameter, was cut out of the same grey 
Letrafilm and applied to 8%"X11" white bristol board. 
The same set of 20 semantic differential scales 
as were used'for the context stimuli in Pilot No. 1 were 
used to measuire the meaning of the shapes. 
Procedure 
The five stimuli were arranged in different random 
orders for each subject and presented on the flip-chart 
manually. Subjects completed a page of 20 semantic differ-
ential scales for each shape. 
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Results 
Mean scores were computed on scale ratings for 
each shape. The initial measure was frequency of extreme 
mean scores (1.0 to 3.0/ and 5.0 to 7.0). Secondly, 
content of the scales with extreme mean scores was examined. 
A summary of the data is given in Table 4. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this pilot was to select a random 
shape for the experiment. Criteria for selection were 
(a) meaninglessness and (b) neutral or a balance of positive 
and negative meaning on semantic differential scales 
which had extreme mean scores. 
The grey circle and grey angular shape were most 
meaningful, with frequencies of 13 and 11 extreme mean 
scores respectively. Thus they were eliminated. The 
black angular shape and the black rounded shape had fre-
quencies of 10 each and the grey rounded shape had 8 extreme 
mean scores. Thus, on the criterion of meaninglessness 
alone the grey rounded shape would heve been selected. 
However, when borderline means, i.e. 3.0 and 5.0, were 
eliminated, all three of these shapes had frequencies of 
6. The content of the scales with extreme scores was 
examined. The black angular shape was described as "unpleas-
ant", "masculine", "hard", and "angular, in contrast to the 
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TABLE 4 
PILOT STUDY NO. 2 
Mean Scale Ratings for Five Stimulus Figures 
Scales Grey Black Black Grey 
Angular Circle Angular Rounded Rounded 
(1.0 to 7.0) 
1. small-large 
2. excitable-calm 
3. light-heavy 
4. cool-warm 
5. meaningful-meaningless 
6. unpleasant-pleasant 
7. horizontal-vertical 
8. bad-good 
9. simple-complex 
10. usual-unusual 
11. masculine-feminine 
12. careful-careless 
13. stable-unstable 
14. fancy-plain 
15. drunk-sober 
16. ugly-beautiful 
17. soft-hard 
18. passive-active 
19. angular-rounded 
20. slow-fast 
Frequency*: 11 13 10 10 8 
When borderline means 
are eliminated: (9) (13) (6) (6) (6) 
^Frequency: number of extreme mean scores, i.e. those falling between 
1.0 and 3.0, and between 5.0 and 7.0 
3 . 0 
4 . 0 
2 . 8 
2 . 4 
5 . 2 
4 . 6 
6 . 8 
4 . 2 
2 . 4 
5 . 6 
3 . 2 
3 . 6 
3 . 8 
5 . 2 
3 . 0 
3 . 8 
5 . 6 
4 . 8 
1 . 0 
4 . 8 
3 . 4 
6 . 0 
3 . 6 
5 . 6 
3 . 2 
5 . 6 
3 . 4 
4 . 8 
1 . 6 
1 . 6 
5 . 4 
2 . 8 
1 . 2 
6 . 8 
5 . 8 
5 . 4 
1 . 8 
4 . 6 
7 . 0 
3 . 4 
4 . 2 
3 . 8 
5 . 0 
3 . 8 
5 . 0 
2 . 8 
6 . 8 
3 . 0 
3 . 2 
5 . 8 
2 . 8 
3 . 8 
3 . 2 
5 . 0 
3 . 8 
3 . 4 
6 . 4 
4 . 4 
1 . 2 
4 . 8 
3 . 6 
5 . 2 
5 . 0 
3 . 0 
4 . 2 
5 . 4 
6 . 0 
4 . 6 
3 . 2 
5 . 6 
5 . 0 
3 . 4 
3 . 6 
4 . 4 
3 . 6 
5 . 0 
2 . 6 
4 . 2 
5 . 6 
3 . 8 
3 . 2 
5 . 4 
3 . 0 
3 . 8 
4 . 2 
4 . 8 
6 . 6 
4 . 0 
2 . 8 
5 . 6 
5 . 0 
3 . 4 
4 . 8 
3 . 8 
3 . 8 
4 . 8 
2 . 4 
4 . 4 
5 . 8 
4 . 0 
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rounded shapes which were described on these same scales 
as "pleasant" (black rounded only), "feminine" (borderline 
scores of 5.0), "soft", and "rounded". The black angular 
shape was eliminated because of its overloading on negative 
scales. 
When the content of scales with extreme scores 
for the black rounded and grey rounded shapes were compared, 
there was very little difference in meaning. The grey 
rounded shape was chosen by the flip of a coin. 
APPENDIX B 
Semantic Differential Scales 
Sample Scale Sheet 
Instructions for Completion of Scales 
Semantic Differential Scales* 
pleasant-unpleasant 
hard-soft. 
active-passive 
careful- careless 
warm-cool 
usual-unusual 
ugly-beautiful 
light-heavy 
slow-fast 
sober-drunk 
fancy-plain 
large-small 
good-bad 
masculine-feminine 
excitable-calm 
stable-unstable 
horizontal-vertical 
simple-complex 
rounded-angular 
meaningful-meaningless** 
* From Elliott and Tannenbaum (1963) 
** Changed from "colourful-colourless" 
ugly : 
heavy * 
unuleaeant J 
warm * 
fancy • 
hard J 
meaningful- ' 
calm 
small ; 
good 
vertical 
simple 
fast 
feminine 
active 
unusual 
careless 
rounded 
sober 
stable 
. • • 
• . e 
• . • 
• . • 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
• e • 
. . . 
• • « 
• • « 
» * . i 
* . • i 
. * < 
• 0 to 
» # . 
• * * 
» . * 
. . . 
* « . 
. . . 
. . . 
• • * 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. • » 
. . . . 
. . . o 
. . . 
. . * 
. . . 
. • • 
. * . 
* • t 
. . . 
. . . 
. . « 
• . « 
» . . * * 
» . . • 1 
. . 4 
• • • « 
1 . . < 
» « * 4 
• » • 
. . . 
• • * 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
• # • 
« . • 
. . . 
. . . 
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• hMiit-i fill 
: light 
»., -, * p5«flR«nt 
• cool 
• plain 
. ,
 :
 soft 
• meaningless 
\,.,. * a*fH table 
• large 
: bad 
».,. ,. 2 horizontal 
' • complex 
». s slow 
'.,. „,t masculine 
* • passive 
J 2 usual 
:
.„„..
 :
 careful 
• ,m , • angular 
s
...,. .
 :
 drunk 
: unstable 
Instructions ~~ 
These scales are designed to measure the meaning of certain 
figures to various people by having them judge them on a series 
of descriptive scales. Please make your judgments on the basis of 
what the figures mean to you* On each page you will find a set of 
scales. You are to rate the figure on each of these scales in order, 
Here is how to use them: 
There are seven (7) positions on each scale. If you feel 
that the figure is very closely related to one end of the scale, 
place your check mark next to the appropriate word: 
Sweet rX^: :_: : : : : Sour 
OR 
Sweet :__: : j : : :X_J Sour 
If you feel that the figure is quite closely related to one end 
of the scale or the other (but not extremely), place your check 
mark as follows: 
Sweet : :.JLS «: : :— ~: : Sour 
OR 
Sweet : : : : : : X : : Sour 
If the figure seems only slightly related to one side as opposed 
to the other (but is not really neutral), then you should check 
as follows: 
Sweet : : : X : : :__ : : Sour 
OR 
Sweet : : : : : X : : : Sour 
The direction towards which you check, of course, depends upon 
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which of the two ends of the scale seems most characteristic of the 
thing you are judging. 
If you consider the fxgure to be neutral on the scale, or 
if the scale is completely irrelevant, unrelated to the figure, 
place your chock mark in the middle space: 
Sweet : ^: _:e _:_JL.S : _: : Sour 
IMPORTANT: 
1. rtace your ch^ck uarks iri the middle ojT spaces, not on the 
bcunoar.\e£„ 
This Not This 
2„ Be sure you check every scale for every figure — do not omit any. 
3* Nefer put more than one (,1) check mark en a single scale. 
Do not try to remember how you ciiecked similar itemn for earlier 
figures when you encounter the same item twice. Make each item 
£ B£Ji^:&£. aftJ independent Judgment. V/ork at fairly high speed 
through the scales. Do not puzzle over individual items. It is 
your first impressions, the immediate "feelings" about the items 
that 1 am interested in. On ttie other hand, jlease do not be care-
less, because I want your true impressions, 
# 
APPENDIX C 
Results of Factor Analysis 
TABLE 5 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
1 5 . 
1 6 . 
1 7 . 
1 8 . 
1 9 . 
2 0 . 
F a c t o r 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
good -bad 
s i m p l e complex 
u n u s u a l - u s u a l 
f e m i n i n e - m a s c u l i n e 
c a r e f u l - c a r e l e s s 
u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
% V a r i a n c e 
C u m u l a t i v e % V a r i a n c e 
Load ing . s f o r F i r s t Four F a c t o r s 
E x p e r i m e n t a l Group 
F a c t o r 1 
' P r e 
- . 0 2 
- . 0 6 
- . 0 0 
- . 1 6 m 
.04 
- . 0 4 
<£3> 
- . 0 7 
. 23 
. 33 
.02 
- . 0 9 
.06 
.00 
£T57) 
- . 3 1 
. 0 5 
.08 
- . 0 9 
2 1 . 5 
P o s t 
- . 4 6 
. 4 1 
- . 0 4 
- . 0 4 
<£HP> 
. 0 1 
.05 
. 4 1 
^ 
. 33 
- . 0 1 
- . 1 4 
€7iD 
- . 2 7 
- . 2 5 
- . 1 7 
.38 
.20 
. 2 5 
4 2 . 5 
F a c t o r 2 
P r e 
. 2 1 (2D 
.14 
. 0 5 
- . 1 8 
- . 1 2 
.02 
. 11 
.08 
- . 0 2 
. 20 
.06 
- . 1 4 
<£S> 
- . 0 6 
.30 
.16 
.30 
>H <3 
2 0 . 2 
4 1 . 7 
P o s t 
- . 0 5 
@) 
7(52 
.20 
- . 0 3 
.06 
- . 0 4 
. 1 5 
.14 
- . 0 4 
.17 
£64) 
- . 2 2 
- . 1 9 (® 
- . 2 6 
- . 1 4 
.70 
.29 
<3> 
1 6 . 8 
5 9 . 3 
- F i g u r e A 
F a c t o r 3 
P r e 
. 0 9 
- . 0 1 
.16 
.37 
- . 1 9 
- . 1 0 
.06 
.07 
<£3) (T7j$ 
ri4 
. 03 
- . 0 9 
.02 
- . 4 0 
- . 2 1 
- . 0 6 
.16 
- . 1 8 
.28 
1 5 . 4 
5 7 . 1 
P o s t 
.08 
- . 2 9 
.29 
.49 
. 45 
.02 
. 3 5 
- . 1 8 
- . 0 9 
.16 
- . 2 4 
. 06 
- . 1 9 
. 05 
- . 2 5 
.18 
0%) 
- . 0 6 
<EHD 
.08 
1 3 . 1 
72 .4 
F a c t o r 4 
P r e 
- . 0 3 
- . 0 3 
- . 0 9 
. 09 
. 2 9 
. 2 1 
.09 
- . 2 6 
- . 1 3 
- . 0 1 
.37 
- . 0 1 
(T94) 
. 0 5 
- . 3 4 
.14 
.34 
. 3 1 
. 0 5 
- . 0 6 
1 1 . 8 
6 8 . 9 
P o s t 
- . 1 0 
. 30 
- . 2 0 
- . 0 3 
.07 
CC77) 
.09 
(0ED 
. 22 
.07 
.46 
. 1 2 
- . 1 4 
- . 0 4 
.22 
- . 4 6 
- . 1 7 
. 10 
. 28 
- . 0 9 
1 2 . 0 
84 .4 
TABLE 6 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors 
Control Group 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
1 5 . 
1 6 . 
1 7 . 
1 8 . 
1 9 . 
2 0 . 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
good -bad 
s i m p l e complex 
u n u s u a l - u s u a l 
f e m i n i n e - m a s c u l i n e 
c a r e f u l - c a r e l e s s 
u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
F a c t o r 1 
• P r e 
. 0 1 
. 3 5 
.12 
- . 0 6 
.09 
. 12 
.22 
- . 0 3 
<lH> 
- . 3 7 
. 3 1 
- . 0 4 
- . 4 1 
5^^  (75*0) 
. 29 
- . 0 6 
<0D 
- . 0 9 
£82) 
P o s t 
.22 
(W5) 
CIS) 
- . 0 9 
.08 
- . 0 9 
- . 1 4 
. 4 5 
<SD 
- . 3 6 
.02 
- . 0 5 
- . 0 4 
- . 1 8 
.22 
- . 2 7 
- . 2 3 
£80) 
•35 
<T84) 
F a c t o r 2 
P r e 
- . 2 9 
.02 
- . 0 3 
- . 0 6 
- . 0 4 
<d[D 
- . 0 8 
- . 3 4 
- . 0 6 
. 4 1 
.12 
• - . 2 2 
C2D 
. 03 
- . 1 5 
cUD 
. 22 
.08 
- . 1 3 
. 0 1 
P o s t 
£83) 
- . 2 5 
. 32 
.48 
- . 0 4 
. 1 1 
- . 2 2 
- . 3 8 
.12 
- . 2 3 
<E2§) 
.28 
- . 0 3 
- . 1 5 
.29 
<73) 
£S 
- 7 2 1 
£3D 
- . 2 3 
% Variance 25.7 33.9 21.2 32.3 
Cumulative % Variance 46.9 66.2 
- Figure A 
F a c t o r 3 
P r e 
. 0 5 
- . 1 8 
<dDD 
. 0 5 
.04 
- . 0 5 
.27 
- . 2 1 
. 10 
. 0 3 
. 43 
<E3§> 
^ 2 6 
.07 
<c3D 
. 13 
. 1 1 
- . 0 3 
. 1 3 
1 5 . 2 
6 2 . 1 
P o s t 
. 12 
- . 1 5 
.22 
- . 4 5 
^ 
- . 1 5 
. 3 5 
.42 
- . 3 8 
- . 1 1 
.46 
- . 2 8 
(—TT5) (7J% 
.13 
- . 0 4 
. 13 
- . 3 1 
. 2 5 
1 2 . 3 
7 8 . 5 
F a c t o r 4 
P r e 
(78f) 
- . 2 3 
.03 
- . 0 1 
- . 1 3 
- . 0 1 
.16 
.00 
- . 2 8 
- . 1 2 
- . 2 1 
. 08 
- . 0 4 
.00 
.07 
~<df) 
.12 
- . 0 9 
- . 1 1 
1 1 . 4 
7 3 . 5 
P o s t 
- . 1 2 
- . 0 4 
- . 1 5 
£53) 
.02 
. 0 1 
(T^0> 
.07 
.18 
.39 
- . 3 8 
. 43 
<=3D 
- . 1 8 
.37 
.34 
.04 
. 3 1 
- . 1 6 
- . 0 2 
1 0 . 8 
8 9 . 3 
TABLE 7 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors - Figure B-l 
Experimental Group 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
1 5 . 
1 6 . 
1 7 . 
1 8 . 
1 9 . 
2 0 . 
Scales 
large-small 
calm-exci table 
heavy-l ight 
cool-warm 
meaningful-meaningless 
unpleasant-pleasant 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
good-bad 
simple complex 
unusual-usual 
feminine-masculine 
ca re fu l - ca re l e s s 
uns t ab le - s t ab le 
fancy-plain 
sober-drunk 
ugly-beaut i ful 
hard-sof t 
pass ive -ac t ive 
rounded-angular 
slow-fast 
• Pre 
. 03 
£H> 
- . 4 1 
- . 0 4 
.06 
(T8J3) 
-70~7 
&§> 
.09 
- . 0 8 
. 2 1 
.32 
- . 1 9 
- . 1 0 
Ss§ (ftjj) 
- . 1 8 
. 17 
- . 0 1 
. 3 5 
P o s t 
.14 
- . 2 0 
. 1 3 
.14 
- . 0 5 
<£H> 
-^_20 
^ 
.02 
f754) 
- . 2 3 
.23 
. 03 
- . 0 7 
<2D 
. 16 
- . 2 2 
- . 0 5 
- . 0 1 
P r e 
(® 
- . 2 4 
.28 
- . 0 3 
- . 0 4 
.04 
- . 0 5 
<£5P 
-7T3 
. 16 
. 09 
- . 3 3 
• - . 0 4 
.07 
- . 0 6 
. 0 3 
.40 
dS§) 
- . 3 7 
- . 4 4 
P o s t 
. 0 1 
.16 
- . 0 4 
. 1 5 
- . 0 8 
.08 
.20 
- . 0 9 
- . 4 6 
- . 0 4 
. 35 
. 15 
- . 0 5 
- . 2 6 
- . 0 1 
<£3§> 
- . 0 7 
.10 
.16 
P r e 
.12 
.17 
.30 
.00 
<rs3) 
. 10 
.10 
- . 0 9 
.13 
(Tf7) 
- . 0 4 
- . 0 7 
- . 0 7 
- . 1 8 
- . 0 5 
- . 0 1 
- . 0 9 
.16 
.06 
- . 2 1 
P o s t 
.02 
- . 0 1 
- . 0 8 
.11 
<fS? 
- . 2 1 
.15 
.14 
<£Ho) 
- . 1 0 
.34 
- . 0 6 
.08 
.24 
- . 0 6 
- . 0 3 
- . 0 0 
- . 1 7 
.24 
P r e 
.08 
. 0 1 
- . 1 1 
- . 0 2 
. 0 5 
. 1 5 
dB> 
. 01 
( r^56) 
.00 
- . 0 1 
- . 0 2 
- . 1 0 
<£§& 
, 17 
.24 
- . 3 4 
- . 3 8 
- . 1 8 
.07 
P o s t 
- . 0 2 
.22 
- . 1 0 
.42 
.18 
- . 2 0 
£2>) 
.19 
- . 3 0 
.16 
- . 1 6 
.10 
<F^$ 
.07 
<S> 
- . 0 6 
.17 
.12 
.02 
.07 
% Variance 36.7 3 7.2 17.8 18.4 13.0 14.1 11.7 10.5 
Cumulative % Variance 54.5 55.6 67.5 69.7 78.2 80.2 
00 
TABLE 8 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
1 5 . 
1 6 . 
1 7 . 
1 8 . 
1 9 . 
2 0 . 
F a c t o r L o a d i n g s 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
g o o d - b a d 
s i m p l e complex 
u n u s u a l - u s u a l 
f e m i n i n e - m a s c u l i n e 
c a r e f u l - c a r e l e s s 
u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
% V a r i a n c e 
C u m u l a t i v e % V a r i a n c e 
f o r F i r s t Four : F a c t o r s 
C o n t r o l Group 
F a c t o r 1 
• P r e 
. 2 1 
- . 0 5 
.22 
<3> 
.06 
<rf2> 70~2 
<rT67) 
.17 
- . 0 9 
.02 
. 2 1 
.44 
- . 1 7 
.00 
(788) 
£56) 
-72~4 
.07 
. 12 
3 2 . 3 
P o s t 
. 40 
.04 
. 10 
(782) 
AA 
<fH> 
- . 0 7 
- . 1 4 
- . 1 8 
- . 3 5 
- . 2 3 
- . 0 9 
. 1 3 
- . 0 6 
- . 1 5 
<-B> 
.33 
<€2S) 
-JA 
< < 6 7 ) 
3 3 . 8 
F a c t o r 2 
P r e 
.07 
.44 
- . 4 4 
.12 
<rH> 
- . 1 2 
- . 1 6 
- . 0 1 
- . 3 7 
- . 0 2 
. 3 1 
<fJo) 
- . 0 8 
<S> 
,02 
. 0 1 
- . 4 6 
. 0 3 
- . 1 4 
.28 
2 4 . 5 
5 6 . 8 
P o s t 
- 7 0 3 
- . 4 3 
. 19 
£ 6 7 ) 
- . 2 5 
.08 
.26 
- . 1 8 
- . 0 0 
. 0 8 
. 15 
CETJOD 
- . 0 1 
£P> 
- . 2 0 
- . 3 5 
- . 3 1 
.24 
.19 
2 3 . 7 
5 7 . 5 
- F i g u r e B - l 
F a c t o r 3 
P r e 
. 0 1 
.24 
.02 
- . 2 2 
- . 4 0 
. 2 3 
Qj) 
- . 0 8 
- . 3 7 
- . 1 2 
. 2 1 
- . 0 6 
- . 1 2 
.02 
. 1 1 
. 3 1 
.18 
726 
.45 
1 5 . 6 
7 2 . 4 
P o s t 
- . 0 9 
- . 3 8 (03> 
- . 1 5 
. 1 0 
.04 
. 0 3 
- . 1 1 
<T86) 
.24 
. 02 
- . 0 4 
.12 
<SHD 
- . 1 7 
.30 
. 19 
. 1 9 
.04 
- . 0 7 
1 2 . 9 
7 0 . 4 
F a c t o r 4 
P r e 
. 0 1 
.24 
.02 
- . 2 2 
- . 4 1 
. 25 
CS> 
- . 0 8 
- . 3 7 
- . 1 2 
. 2 1 
- . 0 6 
- . 1 2 
.02 
. 1 1 
. 3 1 
. 19 
cc35> 
.26 
. 4 5 
8 .8 
8 1 . 2 
P o s t 
. 1 1 
43 
. 1 1 
- . 0 1 
. 0 3 
- . 0 9 
. 03 
. 3 0 
- . 0 4 
- . 3 4 
& 
- . 2 2 
. 26 
. 0 9 
- . 1 0 
^TTD 
--JA 
. 22 
1 0 . 1 
8 0 . 5 
VD 
TABLE 9 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors 
Experimental Group 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
g o o d - b a d 
s i m p l e complex 
u n u s u a l - u s u a l 
f e m i n i n e - m a s c u l i n e 
c a r e f u l - c a r e l e s s 
u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
F a c t o r 1 
' P r e 
• 06 
• 09 
- . 0 7 
<^25> 
£5jf> 
c^Fo) 
•25 
(55) 
. 18 
- . 0 7 
.19 
.12 
- . 2 6 
- . 0 5 
.44 
<-re 
- . 3 7 
- . 0 5 
. 26 
.07 
P o s t 
<B> 
- . 3 4 
.36 
.23 
- . 0 6 
.44 
. 3 3 
<€3§ 
- . 0 5 
.12 
- . 1 1 
<£3D 
.18 
. 0 1 
- . 3 1 
(76Q) 
<32> 
. 0 1 
- . 1 6 
- . 1 3 
F a c t o r 2 
P r e 
- . 2 2 
. 43 
- . 1 0 
- . 0 6 
. 0 1 
.06 
- . 3 9 
. 09 
. 1 1 
- . 0 9 
. 09 
J7J2 
<fT79) 
.09 
.29 
- . 2 6 
.07 
<fH) 
. 0 0 
(TsD 
P o s t 
- . 0 8 
<fJ2) 
- . 1 8 
- . 3 5 
.14 
.02 
- . 2 3 
.22 
.24 
- . 3 7 
£Q> 
.14 
£HD 
- . 0 1 
. 38 
- . 1 1 
- . 0 9 
<f_H) 
- . £ 5 
Ci% 
% Variance 39.8 46.6 17.3 21.0 
Cumulative % Variance 57.1 67.6 
Figure B-2 
P r e 
- . 2 3 
.26 
.03 
- . 1 3 
- . 0 8 
.10 
- . 4 6 
.23 
.02 
- . 0 0 
.22 
- . 1 3 
.03 
.35 
.17 
- . 2 5 
^ 
<m 
.14 
P o s t 
. 1 1 
. 2 1 
- . 0 3 
. 00 
.24 
- . 2 3 
- . 2 3 
. 2 0 
<rJD 
- . 4 6 
.10 
.26 
- • J L Q 
<£T|l) 
(7£u) 
- 7 1 / 
- . 0 3 
. 0 8 
- . 3 3 
.10 
P r e 
.34 
- . 1 0 
<7]0) 
. 20 
. 19 
- . 2 1 
- . 2 3 
- . 0 9 
- . 0 4 
. 2 1 
<£S> 
. 0 5 
.05 
.28 
- . 2 1 
.02 
.18 
- . 4 1 
- . 1 3 
- . 0 3 
P o s t 
.10 
.16 
.04 
- . 2 0 
£H> 
- . 0 4 
<7f3) 
- . 1 3 
- . 0 2 
- . 4 2 
.09 
. 1 1 
. 13 
.12 
. 0 1 
.17 
- . 1 1 
- . 0 7 
- . 2 1 
.16 
13.4 11.3 10.6 9.0 
70.5 78.9 81.1 87.9 
oo 
o 
TABLE 10 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
1 5 . 
1 6 . 
1 7 . 
1 8 . 
1 9 . 
2 0 . 
F a c t o r 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
g o o d - b a d 
s i m p l e complex 
u n u s u a l - u s u a l 
f e m i n i n e - m a s c u l i n e 
c a r e f u l - c a r e l e s s 
u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
% V a r i a n c e 
C u m u l a t i v e % V a r i a n c e 
L o a d i n g s f o r F i r s t Four F a c t o r s 
C o n t r o l Group 
F a c t o r 1 
• P r e 
- . 2 2 
.22 
.10 
- . 3 7 
<7s|) Q85) 
.24 
<TJ2) 
- . 0 5 
. 0 5 
.22 
.23 
- . 3 4 
- . 0 3 
. 1 5 
<£H5> 
- . 2 4 
c£3D 
.04 
.12 
2 9 . 8 
P o s t 
- . 0 7 
@ 
. 19 
- . 0 1 
.24 
. 09 
.47 
. 42 
4§D 
- . 1 2 
- . 1 2 
.26 
£75|> 
<S[I? Q5> 
.12 
. 1 3 
. 38 
.09 
. 33 
36 .4 
F a c t o r 2 
P r e 
- . 1 1 
. 1 0 
cTJ5> 
. 10 
- . 0 1 
.16 
.20 
.02 
<®> 
- . 2 3 
- . 3 5 
.27 (E3^. 
( —. / j y 
.24 
- . 1 3 
- . 0 4 
.09 
- . 0 0 
.34 
2 5 . 0 
5 4 . 8 
P o s t 
- . 0 9 
.29 
.09 
<H3D 
. 2 5 
- . 1 2 
(75*1) 
739 
- . 0 3 
.45 
.06 
.14 
- . 1 0 
. 12 
.03 
- . 0 4 
<£H2> 
. 48 
£zD 
.36 
2 2 . 2 
5 8 . 6 
- F i g u r e B-2 
F a c t o r 3 
P r e 
- . 0 6 
.14 
- . 2 7 
- . 2 5 
. 0 1 
.04 
.08 
. 1 1 
- . 0 1 
. 01 
433) 
- . 0 3 
- . 1 7 
.18 
- . 1 5 
- . 2 2 
<^31) 
456) 
$64) 
£67) 
1 2 . 9 
6 7 . 7 
P o s t 
- . 1 6 
.04 
.07 
. 22 
- . 3 6 
dS> 
- . 0 7 
eUD 
. 20 
- . 2 9 
- . 0 4 
. 0 3 
. 2 8 
- . 3 1 
- . 1 1 
(787) 
- . 1 2 
. 10 
- . 2 2 
- . 2 0 
1 5 . 5 
7 4 . 1 
F a c t o r 4 
P r e 
- . 1 1 
. 0 3 
.17 
- . 1 1 
. 1 5 
433) 
. 22 
.28 
- . 1 5 
-M 
<Ts5 
- . 1 0 
- . 1 5 
<T_ZJ? 
- . 0 6 
- . 1 6 
- . 1 5 
- . 0 2 
- . 4 3 
1 1 . 3 
7 9 . 0 
P o s t 
. 37 
. 19 
- . 0 8 
- . 1 6 
. 43 
- . 0 4 
- . 4 9 
. 3 5 
- . 0 5 
<5754) 
733 
- . 1 6 
- . 0 7 
- . 1 4 
- . 0 9 
.04 
- . 0 1 
. 0 1 
.00 (HP 
1 1 . 8 
8 5 . 9 
00 
TABLE 11 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors 
Experimental Group 
Scales 
1. large-small 
2. calm-excitable 
3. heavy-light 
4 . cool-warm 
5. meaningful-meaningless 
6. unpleasant-pleasant 
7. horizontal-vertical 
8. good-bad 
9. simple complex 
10. unusual-usual 
11. feminine-masculine 
12. careful-careless 
13. unstable-stable 
14. fancy-plain 
15. sober-drunk 
16. ugly-beautiful 
17. hard-soft 
18. passive-active 
19. rounded-angular 
20. slow-fast 
F a c t o r 1 
• P r e 
.22 
. 0 3 
- . 1 0 
- . 0 5 
. 1 1 
e^> 
. 06 m 
- . 0 2 
- . 1 1 
. 29 
<769) 
- . 2 5 
.06 
. 4 1 
O ^ 
- . 0 2 
- .1 .0 
.10 
.07 
P o s t 
.28 
.22 
- . 1 1 
- . 26 
.09 
€2D 
.06 
<© 
- . 1 2 
.02 
<7fJ) 2IJ) 
- 7 2 1 
.12 
.22 
<FT87) 
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TABLE 12 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors 
Control Group 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
g o o d - b a d 
s i m p l e complex 
u n u s u a l - u s u a l 
f e m i n i n e - m a s c u l i n e 
c a r e f u l - c a r e l e s s 
u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
% V a r i a n c e 
F a c t o r 1 
" P r e 
- . 2 3 
£zD 
- . 1 9 
.00 
.24 
. 00 
- . 0 3 
. 39 
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. 20 
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. 0 9 
2 5 . 5 
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TABLE 13 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors 
Experimental Group 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
1 5 . 
1 6 . 
1 7 . 
1 8 . 
1 9 . 
2 0 . 
S c a l e s 
l a r g e - s m a l l 
c a l m - e x c i t a b l e 
h e a v y - l i g h t 
coo l -warm 
m e a n i n g f u l - m e a n i n g l e s s 
u n p l e a s a n t - p l e a s a n t 
h o r i z o n t a l - v e r t i c a l 
g o o d - b a d 
s i m p l e complex 
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u n s t a b l e - s t a b l e 
f a n c y - p l a i n 
s o b e r - d r u n k 
u g l y - b e a u t i f u l 
h a r d - s o f t 
p a s s i v e - a c t i v e 
r o u n d e d - a n g u l a r 
s l o w - f a s t 
Factor 1 
Pre Post 
Factor 2 
Pre Post 
.18 
CET56) 
- . 0 1 
- . 0 4 
.04 
.23 
G.8.9) 
.34 
.22 
- . 2 7 
- . 2 2 
.27 
- . 2 1 (33 
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- . 1 6 
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. 06 
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.32 
.08 
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- . 0 9 
- . 1 0 
.07 
^58) 
S2 
% V a r i a n c e 3 7 .4 3 7 . 9 
C u m u l a t i v e % V a r i a n c e 
2 1 . 9 1 9 . 8 
5 9 . 3 5 7 . 7 
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TABLE 14 
Factor Loadings for First Four Factors 
Control Group 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
1 . 
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APPENDIX D 
Sandler's A 
t^Tests 
D Scores 
87 
TABLE 15 
SANDLER'S A 
Comparison of Pre-Exposure and Post-Exposure Ratings of Figure A 
Scales Experimental Control 
Group Group 
(N=32) (N=21) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
1.247 
1 .347 
1 6 . 3 3 3 
0 .527 
0 . 1 1 1 * 
0 .527 
0 .849 
1 1 . 0 0 0 
2 . 1 1 1 
0 . 8 5 1 
5 7 . 0 0 0 
0 .500 
0 .846 
6 6 . 0 0 0 
2 . 5 0 0 
0 .704 
0 .435 
0 .215* 
0 .315 
2 2 . 5 0 0 
df= 31 
* * = . 0 5 , A^O.264 
0 . 1 1 1 * 
1 .025 
1 .296 
1 .272 
83 .000 
3 .500 
0 .307 
2 .110 
2 .500 
0 .227* 
0 .235* 
0 .208* 
0 .720 
3 .500 
0 .344 
0 .440 
4 .110 
23 .000 
0 .454 
2 .520 
df= 20 
* * = . 0 5 , A<0.267 
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TABLE 16 
t-TESTS 
Comparison of Experimental and Control Group Ratings of Figure A 
Scales Pre-Exposure Post-Exposure 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
1, 
1, 
1. 
1 
1, 
1 
.194 
ns* 
.918 
ns 
.504 
.049 
.653 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
.724 
ns 
ns 
1.355 
ns* 
2.647** 
ns 
1.707 
1.186 
ns 
ns 
1.687 
1.284 
2.322** 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
*ns: not significant by inspection; no calculation made 
**Significant at p=.05 level 
TABLE 17 
D SCOPES — EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
89 
Subjects 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
X* y** 2*** 
6 .557 
6 . 6 3 3 
9 .592 
5 .568 
8 .000 
7 . 6 8 1 
8 .367 
7 . 6 8 1 
5 .745 
6 .403 
9 .274 
7 . 1 4 1 
1 0 . 1 9 8 
5 .292 
1 1 . 5 7 6 
6 . 6 3 3 
7 . 0 0 0 
4 . 2 4 3 
9 .695 
8 .124 
9 .849 
9 .000 
1 0 . 0 0 0 
7 .810 
9 .849 
4 . 6 9 0 
7 . 1 4 1 
9 .950 
8 .185 
7 .616 
5 .568 
8 .246 
5 .385 
7 .000 
9 .849 
. 4 . 899 
7 .680 
3 .740 
1 1 . 4 0 0 
3 .460 
7 .810 
6 .000 
6 .164 
5 .196 
5 .568 
4 . 1 2 3 
8 .718 
6 .403 
7 .810 
4 . 2 4 3 
5 .568 
7 . 1 4 1 
10 .536 
4 .899 
8 .246 
6 .782 
. * 
5 .916 
8 .775 
9 .165 
5 .477 
10 .344 
5 .099 
7 . 0 7 1 
6 .633 
10 .344 
5 .385 
8 .426 
7 .550 
1 3 . 5 6 5 
7 . 6 8 1 
8 .000 
6 .708 
6 .245 
8 .000 
7 .937 
5 .745 
6 .325 
5 .745 
9 . 3 8 1 
3 .742 
9 .747 
8 .544 
11 .136 
9 .747 
6 .708 
7 . 1 4 1 
4 . 3 5 9 
7 . 2 1 1 
7 .280 
7 .000 
9 .055 
7 . 4 8 3 
* X: Distance between ratings of A in pre-exposure and 
post-exposure 
** Y: Distance between ratings of A in post-exposure and 
A in Phase II 
***Z: Distance between ratings of A in pre-exposure and 
A in Phase II 
$ Subject did not return for Phase II; these distances 
not available 
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TABLE 18 
D SCORES — CONTROL GROUP 
Subjects X* Y** Z*** 
** 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
* X: Distance between ratings of A in pre-exposure 
and post-exposure 
Y: Distance between ratings of A in post-exposure 
and A in Phase II 
*** Z: Distance between ratings of A in pre-exposure 
and A in Phase II 
7 .874 
3 . 7 4 2 
6 .245 
5 .196 
9 .950 
5 .099 
7 .348 
8 .718 
6 .557 
7 .000 
5 .385 
1 0 . 4 8 8 
6 .000 
8 .888 
8 .062 
6 .856 
1 1 . 0 9 0 
8 .888 
4 .796 
7 . 4 8 3 
4 . 3 5 9 
* 
* 
4 .899 
4 .690 
7 . 2 1 1 
6 .083 
6 .083 
3 .605 
3 .742 
7 .746 
3 .464 
5 . 2 9 1 
6 .324 
5 .000 
4 .796 
4 . 2 4 3 
4 .000 
6 .324 
8 .944 
8 .367 
8 .367 
4 .899 
6 .324 
7 .416 
7 . 1 4 1 
11 .958 
6 .557 
7 . 0 7 1 
8 .307 
5 .000 
$ Subject did not return for Phase II; these distances 
not available 
